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DD/M&S 73-3177

9 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Management Conference, Office of Security
7 August 1973

1. Present were Howard Osborn and [] representing the Office of Security and Messrs. Brownman, Wattles, [] and the undersigned from the Office of the DD/M&S.

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2. Mr. Osborn opened the discussion with a comment that the first experience in the Office of Security is that management by objectives seems to be creating a significant new workload. Mr. Brownman expressed an interest in the observation but commented that managers have to plan their work and how they expect to accomplish it under any system and the problem may simply be a matter of getting accustomed to a new method.

3. Mr. Osborn gave a general report on the status of actions relating to the achievement of objectives noting that they are behind their plan on objectives 4, 5, and 22.

a. Objective #4 relates to the provision of security support to the non-official cover program. Requirements have not been defined because of the reorganization in the Operations Directorate. It is expected that basic responsibility for non-official cover people and activities will reside with individual Area Divisions. Mr. Brownman suggested that the SSA/DDM&S might be asked to function as a focal point for collecting information and requirements about the NOC requirements. After some further discussion it was agreed that the continuing state of uncertainty about the future of the NOC program raises a question about the validity of this objective for the Office of Security. There is no path of action open to the Office of Security toward the achievement of this objective now and it should be treated accordingly until the next Management Conference two months hence.

b. Objective #5 deals with security in the information handling field. \$400,000 had been requested for this program and only \$100,000 allowed. Reassessment of the objective is required in order to determine what can be accomplished within the resources available. Reorganization in the Office of Security has delayed the reassessment.

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c. Objective #22 relates to the implementation of the CAPER/OS system. It has been delayed as a result of slippage in the MAPS program and related case processing systems. Mr. Osborn reported that functional realignments occurring as a part of the Office of Security reorganization is tending to make the CAPER/OS system a less vital ingredient of their total process. The requirement for the system will be reexamined.

d. Mr. Brownman noted that there are a number of milestones to be met before the October Management Conference and wondered whether any indicators had been detected that there may be impending or potential problems. One of the primary purposes for these Management Conferences, he noted, is to anticipate problems to the extent that it may be practical to foresee them and seek whatever assistance and take whatever action may be possible to minimize them or prevent their becoming problems of significance. Mr. Osborn said that everything looks good at the moment and no problems are anticipated at this time.

4. Mr. Osborn reported that a paper is on the way to the DD/M&S describing in detail the status of the reorganization in the Office of Security. All provisions of the reorganization plan are in effect now except where space is a problem. This is a temporary problem that will be corrected as soon as renovations have been completed. The reorganization and reductions in the Office of Security have made it possible for some personnel to be brought back into the Headquarters building from other locations. The manner in which the reorganization plan was presented has been complimented and has been favorably accepted by employees. There have been a few instances where individuals expressed some initial dissatisfaction with their assignments but these have been confronted and there is no present evidence of any lingering dissidence. Mr. Osborn reported that the long standing practice of maintaining an overt and covert file has been discontinued. Files are being consolidated and only one file will be established and maintained in the future. An intensive file review program is underway in the Office of Security and every professional officer has been charged with eliminating duplicate file entries wherever they may be encountered during the normal use of the files. He observed that the consolidation of technical manpower from the Physical and Technical Security Divisions is expected to improve the professionalism of the individuals involved as well as the functions they are performing. One of the major accomplishments of the reorganization is the merger of the investigative and appraisal functions under single direction where they had been formerly in two different directorates within the Office.

a. Mr. Brownman inquired about the status of the review of the communications security and Technical Division functions which the Director of Personnel has been asked to conduct. Mr. Osborn reported that [] had been charged by the Director of Personnel with responsibility for conducting this review. One meeting

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
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has been held with representatives of all interested parties present and there have been some subsequent discussions between [] and representatives of the Offices of Communications and Security separately.



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c. Returning to the discussion of the reorganization, Mr. Osborn offered the opinion that the Alien Affairs Staff performs a function which is not properly placed in the Office of Security. He recommends that consideration be given to transferring the function to the General Counsel, noting that he would be willing to transfer the individual and the function but would prefer not to give up the position. The individual who performs the Alien Affairs function is also the Deputy Chief of the Operational Support Branch. Mr. Brownman said that he and Mr. Wattles would discuss this proposal with the Acting General Counsel.

5. It was noted that the badge machine proposal had been moved forward from FY 1975 to FY 1974 without further comment.

6. Mr. Osborn expressed some wonderment at the elimination from the Office of Security program submission of all funds for the replacement of the Alarm Control Monitor Panel. They are experiencing an average of about two malfunctions a day. Mr. Brownman speculated that the alarm panel might be accorded a low priority because of the fundamental presumptions that the peripheral security of the Headquarters building and compound against unauthorized access and the general reliability of people who are authorized unescorted access. Mr. Osborn refuted that rationale by alluding to a project which had demonstrated the penetrability of the building. The Office of Security will request funds for replacement of the alarm panel next year. We might also consider it as an unfunded item later this year and begin replacing the panel if the funds become available for reprogramming.

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7. Since we have had no specific request to respond to the IG Survey of the Office of Security, and since many of the points raised in the survey are covered in the objectives of the Office of Security, it was agreed that a separate response to the IG Survey will not be necessary until we receive instruction to the contrary. Instead the recommendations will be discussed in the context of these bimonthly management conferences. /C 25X1

10. The Office of Security is reexamining their records to determine whether any of the 35 summer employees who admitted to drug usage in 1973 were among the group of 35 who admitted to it in 1972. /

11. The Office of Security has been working closely with [] in the CI Staff in the area of terrorist activity. OS has developed a nucleus of trained officers who can be sent anywhere in the world to offer training and assistance to our people who may be threatened by terrorist activity. These activities are coordinated closely with the Department of State and other concerned agencies of the Government. The Director of Security intends to submit a recommendation to the DDO that a terrorist committee be formed for the purpose of developing and implementing a continuing coordinated program for protection against terrorist activity. 25X1

12. The effect of the holddown on funding for ACM equipment on Technical Division objectives was not discussed.

13. CIA has a record of fewer accidents per thousand man hours than most other Government agencies. Everyone agrees that working conditions should be as free from hazards as we can make them but when it comes to allocating resources, other programs generate more enthusiasm. Mr. Osborn believes that the safety program is misplaced organizationally in the Office of Security. Mr. Brownman suggested that consideration be given to reliance upon GSA for such essentials of a safety program as are necessary. If the Agency must have its own safety program, or a program to supplement the basic GSA responsibility, Mr. Osborn suggests that it be transferred to the Office of Logistics. It was agreed that these questions should be raised with the Director of Logistics. ✓

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14. Mr. Osborn reported that the data base identifying unauthorized leaks is limited but effective. He cited several examples recently where responses to inquiries had been furnished within a matter of a few hours. One of the problems with the system is that there is no way of knowing whether all identifiable leaks have been fed into the system and no way of monitoring it. The system is effective within the limitations of the information in it, but there is no way of knowing what might be missing. At present 312 "leaks" are in the data base. Investigation of disclosures



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16. Congressional interest in amending CIA legislation is expected to be intense immediately after the present recess. It was agreed that the Office of Security and other components in the M&S Directorate should begin actively to prepare themselves to present information in support of the protection of functions essential to the Agency's mission with particular emphasis on legitimate domestic activities. If we are prohibited from [redacted] the effectiveness of the Agency will be seriously impeded.

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Chief, DD/M&S Plans Staff

cc: Director of Security

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